For a company whose motto is "Don't be evil," Google certainly has its share of detractors. The company is at the center of numerous controversies that will determine how people use the Internet, find information, and communicate with each other. The past year has involved both business launches and legal decisions that will reshape Google's future, alter the online environment, and potentially revise copyright and trademark law, including: the marketing of trademarks in online search, the proposed Book Search settlement, the Viacom v. YouTube copyright infringement case, and looming antitrust investigations. The article explores the future of Google as it consolidates its control over online search and advertising and expands into telecommunications, mobile devices and cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Google has grown to become the largest U.S. advertising company and a supplier of a wide array of software products. 1 As this corporate behemoth reaches its teen years, the time has come to see how it is growing to meet its corporate goals and how the advertising giant affects the world it bestrides. ("Americans use Google for about two-thirds of U.S. searches, and the company has more than 70 percent of U.S. search advertising revenue, and about 90 percent in Europe⎯say the expanded list of competitors is an attempt by Google to paper over its dominance.").
and services it provides, one can wonder whether Google still has a focus. Perhaps Google is treading the path of IBM, growing too diffuse, risking antitrust problems and thrashing in the market without a clear direction. IBM reinvented itself as a service company, but only after fighting a twenty-year antitrust investigation, the launch of competitors like Microsoft, and losing the PC market it had created. 34 Or perhaps Google is following in Microsoft's footsteps, becoming the very company its founders most despised; shifting from innovator to aggregator of innovation, acquiring its market share rather than innovating its growth, and struggling to extend its powerful brand into fields in which it has neither presence nor expertise. 35 Or perhaps the mantra of "don't be evil" will help it chart a third course, which enables it to remain the darling of the public and the stockholders alike.
III. MIXED MESSAGES AND MERGERS
Google has grown through both innovation and acquisition. 36 The most controversial was in April 2007, when it purchased DoubleClick, the leading firm in display ad placement. 37 Although Google rules the market for targeted text ads that are linked to search results on its own and others' websites, New York-based DoubleClick [was] a leading provider of technology to deliver elaborate, targeted display ads to websites. Mountain View, [California]-based Google aims to create a one-stop, fullservice shop for companies placing ads online and off. 35. Christine Varney, head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, provided her prediction of the future.
"For me, Microsoft is so last century. They are not the problem." The U.S. economy will "continually see a problem-potentially with Google" because it already "has acquired a monopoly in Internet online advertising," she said . . . "When all our enterprises move to computing in the clouds and there is a single firm that is offering a comprehensive solution . . . you are going to see the same repeat of Microsoft 39 Although a four-to-one majority found no horizontal monopoly and no lessening of competition, the dissenting Commissioner took a more forward-looking view:
[E]ven more troubling is that the combination of Google and DoubleClick likely will affect the evolution of the entire online advertising market-especially in light of existing network effects, and the tremendous additional network effects the transaction will generate. . . . By purchasing DoubleClick, Google will acquire data that will contribute to, and exacerbate, network effects. As a result, the Google/DoubleClick combination is likely to "tip" both the search and display markets in Google's favor, and make it more difficult for any other company to challenge the combined firm.
40
The Google/DoubleClick merger was only one such acquisition that raised questions regarding the ability of competitors to overcome the network effects of Google's omnipresence. In the fall of 2008, Google and Yahoo! were forced to abandon a proposed agreement to have Google fulfill some of Yahoo's ad searches due to Justice Department objections. 41 One year earlier, Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion. 42 In the three years since the acquisition, YouTube continues to lose money and has started a transition from user-generated content to content provided by the traditional movie and television studios. 43 Along the way, of course, it embroiled itself in a billion dollar lawsuit with some of those same content producers over the unauthorized posting of film and television content by YouTube users. 44 39. GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5. When a publisher side ad server makes a call to retrieve an advertisement, the advertiser side ad server determines the optimal advertisements, pulls that ad from its inventory, and serves it into the designated place on the publisher's web page. Advertiser side ad servers also provide key data that is used to plan, manage, maintain, track, and analyze the results of online campaigns across multiple publisher websites. Like publishers, advertisers pay for the use of ad serving services on a cost per thousand ads served.
40. GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5. ("A network effect arises when a good or service increases in value as more people use it. Feedback fosters acceptance and enhances popularity, which generates even more feedback, in a continually self-reinforcing loop."). If the DoubleClick merger caused antitrust concerns, the YouTube acquisition raised the opposite question: why acquire a money-losing aggregator of Internet videos? Never fully explained by the company, the elusive answer may also be tied to Google's long-term media-dominance strategy. Broadcast television and radio are no different in business organization than the search business-in both cases, the broadcaster displays content free to the consumer but surrounded with advertising. From this perspective, YouTube is no different from CBS, Yahoo, or a web search.
The difference between YouTube and broadcast television remains profitability. 45 Although Google does not break out YouTube income, analysts continue to acknowledge the losses at YouTube. 46 While traditional media is shrinking, it continues to be profitable, and it is further extending its reach. 47 Founded by Fox and NBC, Hulu.com has already earned greater revenue than YouTube on a fraction of its audience base. 48 The potential to extend the per-viewer average revenue becomes significant. 49 Google has recognized the shift by entering into distribution agreements with traditional media companies. 50 Ironically, Hulu embodies the disruptive technology threatening the traditional broadcast television industry. Hulu is on-demand television which directly competes with traditional television.
51
YouTube's usergenerated content reflects a different content segment. 52 More accurately, however, YouTube still competes for viewership with traditional television, and while the tastes and format of YouTube may vary from that of broad- cast television, such differences will continue eroding as audiences gravitate to YouTube as a source of film and television content.
53
So the question remains whether Google's acquisition of YouTube was a short-sighted folly or a long-term strategy for dominance. 54 If the broadcasters continue to decline, a central site that delivers content to computers, portable music/video devices, cellular phones and Internet-equipped televisions could become the new media hub. Consumers want convenience and they prefer free. While iTunes and the iPhone are convenient, they are tethered to a proprietary platform with high equipment costs and noticeable content costs. 55 Hulu is great for traditional television and movies. 56 Google is the quintessential content aggregator-delivered for free in exchange for advertising. 57 Therefore, YouTube may be a long-play for Google. But with such a dominant audience base, it will pose a formidable beachhead against other participants entering the business.
Google's history with traditional media may suggest that it has been motivated by a strategy to control ad placement across all media. 58 Google attempted to enter the offline advertising business for newspapers, radio and television as an extension of its Internet dominance, but with far less success. 59 For two years, Google tried to operate a business placing print ads 60 and though the program grew to 800 newspapers, tending to control only the supplemental ad space that the papers were unable to sell. 61 As a result, Google had to close the print ad business, and a month later, Google closed its radio ad program as well, 62 eventually selling the division with its 3600 employees. 63 Google continues to persevere in advertising sales for broadcast television, perhaps because of its long-term synergy with YouTube. Taken together, the strategy of acquiring companies to expand beyond ad placement into the role of ad broker and broadcaster reflects a solid, vertical integration for the advertising giant. 65 The FTC analysis of the DoubleClick merger highlights the strategy. 66 Google chose to purchase technology companies that provide toeholds into advertising delivery in each media, allowing it to expand both horizontally and vertically. 67 Rather than become DoubleClick's competitor, Google chose to pay billions of dollars to eliminate a future competitor from the field.
68 Implicit in the strategy, Google further benefits by eliminating a potential acquisition target for its chief competitors-namely, Microsoft, Apple and Yahoo!.
This approach is not new to Google. To the contrary, it goes to the central business strategy of the company. 69 As Mark Cuban recently noted, Google "almost joined a long list of companies in the 'great technology, no business model' archives." 70 In April 2002, Google faced a patent litigation lawsuit from Overture Services, Inc., "asserting that certain services infringed Overture's U.S. Patent No. 6,269,361" (361 patent). 71 Initially, Google "denied that it infringed the patent and alleged that the patent was invalid and unenforceable." 72 The patent in question covered the heart of the AdWords business model.
73
In 2003, Yahoo! acquired control of Overture and in so doing, took ownership of the Google core business model. 74 As Google prepared to go public, it entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with Yahoo!, pricing the "fully-paid, perpetual license to the patent" and mutual release 65 of 2.7 million shares of Google Class A common stock. 75 The 2.7 million shares of Google stock, one percent of its stock at the time, covered the Overture 361 patent and other disputes between the parties. 76 From a competitive standpoint, the settlement was the flexion point between the two search companies. Google was free to grow its business model and to stop denying the patentability of the AdWords methodology. Yahoo!, which had paid $1.63 billion to acquire Overture, received substantially less than one-fifth the value of Overture from the Google settlement.
77
Yahoo! struggled to recapture its investments and began looking back on its strategy while Google cleared itself of potentially game-ending litigation and moved forward as the dominant search engine on the Internet.
IV. SO WHY THE SOFTWARE?-THE NON-ADVERTISING STRATEGY
An admittedly cynical interpretation of Google's "don't be evil" strategy flows from its own approach to advertising. Only recently did Google begin to advertise. According to the advertising giant's behavior, advertising is evidently for chumps. Nonetheless, Google has spent some ad money on billboards to promote its software suite and its apps, including Google Docs. 78 A less cynical view of Google recognizes that since Google already associates its name with every ad sold on behalf of its various advertising businesses, it needs a different strategy to promote its brand.
By providing free products, Google reinforces its name as an Internet destination and resource. 79 Some of these services deliver behavioral advertising while others do not generate direct revenue. As a business strategy, these free products are less expensive to develop and deliver than the comparable amount of direct advertising. Moreover, direct advertising is generally not friendly, so the Google app strategy makes sense from its corporate agenda.
The bonus for the strategy is the cost aspect of the developed products. By focusing on the core business of Microsoft (including free competitive products for operating systems, browsers, documents, spreadsheets, presentations, e-mail, and calendars), Google highlights Microsoft's vulnerability to alternatives. 80 The cultures were very compatible, both driven by innovation and a deep distrust, if not hatred, of common competitor, Microsoft. Apple and Microsoft were direct competitors in almost every product line, including computer operating software, applications, music players and smart phone systems. 84 Google's web-based apps reduced Microsoft's advantage from its installed base, a change which favored Apple.
85
In the years since the iPhone launch, however, the two companies have been on a collision course. 86 Google's Android phone software competes as directly with the iPhone as with the Windows Mobile platform; Google's Chrome browser competes directly with Apple's attempt to move its Safari browser onto PCs, and the Chrome operating system announcement could put Apple's modest market share at far greater risk than Windows. 87 Both Apple and Google court the student and individual user, while Windows greatest strength remains in the corporate market. 88 Even worse for Apple, Chrome is designed to support the netbook market segment, the lowest cost web-focused machines. 89 These compete with Apple's iPhone as much as low-end computer sales. 90 The growth of the netbook market has put significant price pressure on Apple's generally more expensive hardware. secrets of its company. Mere advisors, of course, do not necessarily have the same access to inside information as do board members.
If the directors are shielded from the strategic inside information to avoid potential or actual conflicts of interest, then they may be failing to meet their fiduciary duties. Therefore, at a bare minimum the interlocking boards create the appearance of impropriety. Section 8 of the Clayton Act provides direct regulation of interlocking directorates, 102 but the applicability of Section 8 depends on the level of financial competition.
103
Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, one person from serving as a director or officer of two competing corporations if two thresholds are met. Competitor corporations are covered by Section 8 if each one has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $10,000,000, with the exception that no corporation is covered if the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $1,000,000. Section 8(a)(5) requires the Federal Trade Commission to revise those thresholds annually, based on the change in gross national product. The new thresholds, which take effect immediately, are $25,319,000 for Section 8(a)(1), and $2,531,900 for Section 8(a)(2)(A).
104
The interlock problem is self-evident. " [W] hen an individual simultaneously serves as an officer or director of two competing companies, he or she stumbles into a prime opportunity for collusion-for example, coordination of pricing, marketing, or production plans of the two companies." 105 The self-evident concept may be more difficult for the FTC to enforce. Given that Google has no "competitive sales" of its free products, the FTC will need to value the competitive products in a different manner if it wishes to use Section 8 jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the interlocking board problem violates Google's internal policies on conflict of interest:
All of us should avoid circumstances that present even the ap- Could the potential relationship or situation create an incentive for me, or be perceived by others to create an incentive for me, to benefit myself, my friends or family or an associated business, at the expense of Google?
If the answer to any of these questions is 'yes,' the relationship or situation is likely to create a conflict of interest, and you should avoid it. 106 Arguably, any conduct sufficient to trigger an FTC investigation should be considered "perceived by others to create an incentive . . . to benefit . . . an associated business, at the expense of Google." 107 A second reason the interlocking directorates violate Google's internal policy stems from its potential to be a violation of the Sherman Act which prohibits combinations in restraint of trade.
When Google was a scrappy young company fighting the Microsoft colossus, its sniping tactics designed to tweak Microsoft had little market effect. Today, Google dominates the search market.
110 Any actual collusion between Apple and Google regarding operating systems or browsers would violate the Sherman Act and sitting together in board meetings regarding these products cannot help but raise at least the appearance of impropriety. 111 Schmidt's resignation is a good step, but all overlapping directors should be eliminated if the company takes its ethical code seriously.
VI. ANTITRUST CONCERNS EXTEND TO CONTENT -THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH SETTLEMENT
Stemming from Google's drive to organize all information, 112 it began the process of digitizing books at the nation's great libraries, starting with Page's alma mater, the University of Michigan.
113
"Even before we started Google, we dreamed of making the incredible breadth of information that librarians so lovingly organize searchable online," said Larry Page, Google co-founder and president of Products. "Today we're pleased to announce this program to digitize the collections of these amazing libraries so that every Google user can search them instantly.
Our work with libraries further enhances the existing Google Print program, which enables users to find matches within the full text of books, while publishers and authors monetize that information," Page added. . . . and generate book sales via "Buy this Book" links and advertising. For users, Google's library program will make it possible to search across library collections including out of print books and titles that weren't previously available anywhere but on a library shelf.
114
The project has developed an unprecedented scale. Professor Pamela Samuelson described it as "[o]ne of the most significant developments in the history of books, as well perhaps in the history of copyright. . . ." 115 The process resulted in an abortive competitive effort from Microsoft, and lawsuits by the Authors Guild and a group of commercial publishers. 116 After three years of negotiations, the litigation resulted in a proposed settlement between the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publishers, and Google. 117 The proposed settlement received preliminary approval November 14, 2008, but final approval has been delayed by public criticism and the Justice Department's interest in the settlement terms. 118 After the parties made revisions to address these concerns, the District Court granted preliminary approval to the Amended Settlement Agreement on November 19, 2009.
119
The focus of the public concern has not centered on any copyright considerations. Google's action of copying materials which are not in the public domain violates the exclusive rights of authors and publishers, 120 but such violations may be permitted under the law if it constitutes fair use. 121 Interestingly, whether the public perceives Google's actions as copyright infringement or as fair use seems to turn on the individual's more general view of Google as a socially desirable public benefactor or as a piratical advertising shill. Even though "motive" is not part of the fair use analysis, such characterization often affects the fact finder's ultimate disposition.
122
Reproduction of a work, unlike performance or display, does not need to be conducted publicly to constitute infringement. 123 As courts have recognized, copying may still be actionable.
124
[I]ntermediate copying . . . may infringe the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner in section 106 of the Copyright Act regardless of whether the end product of the copying also infringes those rights. If intermediate copying is permissible under the Act, authority for such copying must be found in one of the statutory provisions to which the rights granted in section 106 are subject.
125
Of course, the copying of public domain materials is of high social utility and benefit. Those materials are not in question. Google has made these public domain works generally available, though it incorporates a Google watermark onto the PDF copy. 126 Nonetheless, Google has already begun to make commercial use of its public domain library by licensing the collection to Sony for its e-book reader.
127
This may have significant commercial utility for both Google should be lauded. 128 Nonetheless, Professor Samuelson raises concerns that nothing in the proposed book settlement requires Google to "withdraw these books from display . . . or to charge for them in the future." 129 The only limit on Google regarding the public domain works is the public domain nature of the files. The mere scanning of the PDF is insufficient to make the books copyrightable. 130 Moreover, it is unlikely the imposition of the watermark will rise to the level of trademark protection for the public domain works.
131 "The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like 'the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.'" 132 Were Google to attempt to extend any ownership on its public domain materials, it would not only violate a long line of established Supreme Court intellectual property precedent, but it would undoubtedly jump from public darling to imperial predator in a single step. 133 Therefore, the public domain should remain safe since the public benefitted from its diligence.
Unlike the public domain materials, the copying by Google of copyrighted books, without authorization, constitutes intermediate copying without regard to the eventual display of those books. At first blush, the copyright case closest to the Google Book Project is UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., where, MP3.com provided a service similar to the service Google provides.
134
[D]efendant MP3.com, on or around January 12, 2000, launched its "My.MP3.com" service, which it advertised as permitting subscribers to store, customize and listen to the recordings contained on their CDs from any place where they have an internet connection. To make good on this offer, defendant purchased tens of thousands of popular CDs in which plaintiffs held the copyrights, and, without authorization, copied their recordings onto its computer servers so as to be able to replay the recordings for its subscribers. So MP3.com acted somewhat better than Google in that it purchased the works it copied. Nonetheless, even though the space-shifting is presumably fair use, the massive unauthorized intermediate copying is still actionable. 136 The court did not even consider the issue closely. "The complex marvels of cyberspatial communication may create difficult legal issues; but not in this case. Defendant's infringement of plaintiff's copyrights is clear."
137 One feature of the Google Book Project, however, was not part of the MP3.com model. Copyright owners could "opt out" of the system.
138
A brief application of the four statutory fair use prongs highlights the importance of Google's opt out policy. 139 The benefits of creating an archive of the world's published knowledge is self-evident, so the digitizing would likely be deemed as an important and productive use of the works copied. Moreover, even though there is no transformation for any particular work, the archive as a whole could be deemed transformative, thus favoring Google. 140 "The more substantial the contribution that the later author makes to the expressive domain by his use of copyrighted materials, the more likely that use is to be deemed a fair use. .com because the copyright holder could "opt out" from having the work appear on Google's site. "After some academic and commercial publishers objected to the Library Project, Google took a brief hiatus from scanning to allow publishers time to identify works that they, i.e., the copyright holders, do not want to be included in the digital database. This has been referred to an 'opt out' plan.").
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) . Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
140. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 561.
superseding)."

141
As for the second prong, the nature of the works will vary. Poets may be concerned that even a small portion of a book could reproduce their entire creative work, while academic works will be more widely available, so the second factor is unhelpful. 142 As to the third factor, the amount taken is the entirety of the work, thus favoring the plaintiffs. 143 As often is the case, the outcome could turn on the fourth prong-the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work, and the potential is certainly there. 144 The digitization could have been licensed for a fee. The online snippets might have a discrete market value and Google should admit that access to the database has significant economic value to improve its search algorithms, speech recognitions software, and other products. 145 The potential market could be quite large in the aggregate. For any one author or publisher, the benefits may be modest and potentially market speculative, but taken as a class, the market becomes quite significant.
146
Publishers were rightly concerned that a fair use court determination would turn copyright "on its head," requiring copyright owner to object as a precondition of enjoining infringement.
147
But these are topsy-turvy times for which Google's opt out provision could well satisfy the general anti-copyright sentiment of the public. Still, Google's honeymoon as the only beloved corporate behemoth has been fading. 148 If the Book Project were perceived as a cynical tool to sell advertising, then Google would be seen as usurping a market the publishers should have been able to license. If Google could actually make a significant profit, then it should license the works, which is the essence of the fair use analysis for commercial reproduction. The fair use analysis suggests that the Google Book Search database should be licensed. Therefore, the parties attempted settlement, and Proponents of the Google Book Search settlement point to the societal benefits. Mark Lemley, a highly regarded intellectual property professor at Stanford and a lawyer for Google, explains the benefits as follows:
The settlement will permit Google to digitize most books published in the U.S. Members of the public will have access to electronic copies of previously unavailable works: It will be possible to search the content of the books for free, and to preview full pages from out-of-print books for free, allowing members of the public to find the books and the information they need. People who decide they want a book for themselves will be able to buy a digital version that they can read online. Libraries will be given licenses to provide free, complete access to outof-print books at terminals in their buildings. And institutions will be able to buy subscriptions to vast catalogs of works. The public gets access to works that have, as a practical matter, been unavailable for years or decades and have never been searchable; authors and publishers get revenue from works that had long since stopped generating any. The result is clearly beneficial to all concerned.
150
Lemley's analysis, however, does not address the antitrust issues involved with Google's position in this system. 151 Nor does it address the costs associated with these benefits.
152
One cost associated with the benefit is borne by the rights holders to so-called orphan works-those copyrighted books for which the rights holder cannot be identified. 153 In some cases, the orphan works are created when publishers go out of business without assigning their copyrights; in other cases orphan works arise from poorly managed estates, or in other situations where the rights transfers are forgotten, lost or mishandled. 154 In these cases, the party with the legal right to enforce the copyright is unknown, thus making it all but impossible for publishers to ask for permission to use these works. 155 Parties who respect copyright law cannot find a legitimate copyright holder from whom to license the rights; infringers can act with impunity if they dare.
156
Despite suggestions to the contrary, 157 the experience of many entertainment attorneys may bear out the proposition that orphan works do not actually dominate the out-of-print market. In many situations, the copyright has descended to multiple family members by will or intestate succession. These family members have limited incentive to police the copyrights of out-of-print works unless the book suddenly becomes the focus of a possible film deal or other high-value transaction. In most cases, the rights holders for out-of-print books are known; they just are not interested.
158
From an antitrust perspective, the settlement provides Google a unique market position to be free of the risk of litigation for all orphan works. 159 Google will be the only company that can lawfully sell the orphan works or monetize advertising related to them. 160 Every other company that elects to do so risks the orphan finding a parent. The Google Book Search highlights the orphan works problem and should encourage rights owners to seek their rights with the lure of obtaining lost revenue.
161
Part of the settlement requires Google to support a non-profit, collective rights organization called the Book Rights Registry (BRR), who would collect and distribute the revenue. 162 The BRR is required to provide provenance information about the works claimed, further reducing the scope of the orphan works problem. 163 If the revenue is significant, the number of 156. See id. 157. Professor Samuelson suggests that orphan works are "most" of the seventy percent of the books in the Book Search repository. But that appears to conflate books for which the transaction costs of enforcing the copyright outweighs the value of the copyright with those works which have no one able to enforce their rights. The settlement now also specifies that a portion of the revenue generated from unclaimed works may, after five years, be used to locate rightsholders, but will no longer be used for the Registry's general operations or redistributed to other rightsholders. 163. Id.
phantom works will shrink. If the revenue is not significant, there is no market to monopolize. A legislative or judicial modification could further improve the situation. 164 A second class action lawsuit or Congressional act should provide a safe harbor for any publisher that wishes to publish a work from the BRR, which has not had its copyright owners identified following the five years that royalties were collected on behalf of the work. Such a safe harbor would protect publishers if the rights holders ever come forward. Such a solution would negate the cultural, rather than legal, monopoly that Google's presence in the Book Search provides. 165 While there is no doubt that Google will receive some network effect benefits from the orphan works, the scope of these rights is trivial to the overall publishing market. This should not be the source of antitrust concerns. The real value in improving the search algorithms and other products flows from the scope of the database, which is largely built by publishers that have acceded to the class action settlement, as well as physical access to the public domain works in the collection. 166 A different aspect of the case, however, does raise more serious antitrust considerations. Pursuant to the proposed settlement, "Google agreed to turn over 63 percent of the revenues and data regarding use and sales to a 'Registry' that would distribute the funds to copyright holders." 167 At the time of the initial proposed settlement, the U.S. Department of Justice raised antitrust and other concerns.
168 "First, through collective action, the Proposed Settlement appears to give book publishers the power to restrict price competition. Second . . . other digital distributors may be effectively precluded from competing with Google in the sale of digital library prod-
See id. ("[T]
he settlement agreement takes one important step towards opening up access to unclaimed books. In the meantime, we [Google] 168. See generally Statement of Interest by the U.S. Dept. of Justice Regarding the Proposed Settlement, supra note 118, at 27 (noting also that the DOJ raised concerns related to the representation of the class, which are important to the litigation but less relevant here to the characterization of Google and its conduct).
ucts and other derivative products to come." 169 The Justice Department's characterization is accurate and has remained unaddressed by the amendment to the proposed settlement. 170 The proposed settlement allows Google, the Authors Guild, and the Association of American Publishers to agree on a pricing mechanism for digital works. 171 For example, the settlement allows Google to set an institutional fee for access to the collected database on a full-time-equivalency (FTE) basis.
172
The economic terms for Institutional Subscriptions of Books will be governed by two objectives: (1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each Book and license on behalf of Rightsholders; and (2) the realization of broad access to the Books by the public, including institutions of higher education. Plaintiffs and Google view these two objectives as compatible, and agree that these objectives will help assure both long-term revenue to the Rightsholders and accessibility of the Books to the public. 173 To the extent that the Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers agrees with Google that broad access and maximizing revenue are compatible, they are engaging in behavior that should be questioned under the Sherman Act. 174 The goal of authors and publishers is to maximize revenue, which may be achieved by raising prices or by lowering prices to encourage greater adoption. In either case, the activity of combining the class action of publisher and authors with Google is a massive agreement to set prices. This fits uncomfortably within the competitive framework by: "(1) the creation of an industry-wide revenue-sharing formula at the wholesale level applicable to all works; [and] (2) the setting of default prices and the effective prohibition on discounting by Google at the retail level . . . ." 175 Similarly, digital copies of books may be sold at a price "to be determined by an algorithm (the "Pricing Algorithm") that Google will design to find the optimal price for each such Book in order to maximize revenues 169 for the Rightsholder for such Book . . . ." 176 This optimization and maximization allows Google to quantify the market for books based on sales data and other information that private publishers could never share with one another. Amendments to the provision imply that the pricing will be based on comparisons of each book to the market rather than a dynamic database (which would create a further pricing advantage for Google) but the requirement that price data be "historical" will not have pro-competitive effects. 177 The optimization is unlikely to be in furtherance of price competition or the best interests of the consumer public.
Contrast the proposed Google settlement with the settlements involving ASCAP and BMI. 178 In the case of the consent action involving the performing rights societies, the court administrating the consent decree retains jurisdiction over the competitiveness of the licenses. 179 Unlike the Google settlement, ASCAP and BMI are not left to set the market prices without supervision.
180 "Although, under the terms of the BMI Consent Decree, BMI bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its rates, the setting of appropriate rates remains the responsibility of the District Court." 181 Absent this continuing supervision, the ability of the parties collectively-or Google on the parties' behalf-to set the prices for digital content appears to reach the same anticompetitive heights as ASCAP and BMI meet with regard to public performances. The court's failure to recognize this in its preliminary approval is more likely to be the source of the Justice Department's interest than concern for orphan works. While the consent decree involving ASCAP and BMI suffers from excessive judicial entanglement, it has created a mechanism for fair licensing and public accountability for collectively managed private intellectual property resources. This is the accountability missing from the current proposed settlement. Worse yet, the internal dispute process is subject to a blanket of confidentiality, further hiding the mechanisms of the content pricing. 182 The move towards a collective rights arrangement is in the settlement. The BRR al- ready acts as an author's rights society, which will encourage membership through payments. 183 This is only an interim step, however, for "the settlement does not directly confer on BRR the right to license any books." 184 As with other concerns, Google faces scrutiny over the Google Book Search in many countries, such as Germany, France and China. 185 The outcomes and solutions are likely to vary considerably from country to country. In most countries, the performing rights societies are government agencies, so the ASCAP/BMI consent decree is unique in the world. As such, this proposed resolution is unlikely to be adopted by other nations. The Internet may be global, but nations remain territorial and apply their laws accordingly. Hopefully, the Justice Department will insist that the court exercise far greater control over the pricing and other collusive aspects of the proposed settlement, substituting its own authority for that of the American Arbitration Association.
VII. COPYRIGHT ISSUES STILL AT STAKE
Even if the orphan book issues are economically overstated by critics, the Book Search Project and the massive digitization continues to have significant copyright implications. The first is simply the existence of the project itself. By its very nature, Google's action of copying first and then negotiating only once it held a valuable corpus of content simply flies in the face of international copyright law and ethical corporate governance. In essence, Google's approach has been one of "too big to jail"-an approach that has thus far succeeded in the U.S. but is less welcome in other countries. 186 than indexing web content 188 -a deeply cynical analysis hardly consistent with a company that strives to do no evil. If the company truly believes its actions are beyond reproach from a copyright standpoint, then the choice to settle does not reflect good corporate stewardship. If the company is choosing to settle a copyright case it knows it can win because of the antitrust immunity it affords, then the public is undoubtedly the loser. Only if the fair use argument is indeterminable does Google have an honorable reason to settle the litigation, a position the Chief Legal Officer seems unwilling to concede.
Getting past the predatory intent, there is a second shadow thrown by the decision to settle the litigation. The settlement creates another topsyturvy result to fair use, making the printing of pages from Google public access terminals subject to a printing fee even if the same material printed elsewhere would be treated as fair use. 189 This creates a normative change regarding the expectations of publishers to capture the photocopy revenue that has traditionally been considered fair use. 190 This normative expectation will undoubtedly delight publishers-the beneficiaries of the price setting-but actually undermine the very fair use values Google aspires to protect. Google will not be the only source for some of these books, but the network effect of Google's growing content empire may threaten meaningful competition. As a result, Google's size may rewrite fair use in unexpected and unintended ways.
The impact of "too big to jail" creates an additional copyright policy concern. If the settlement approach creates a precedent, it will encourage other copyright predators to seek sufficient network effects in order to overcome copyright owners' objections to the use of their content. In fact, this strategy may already be observed in Viacom v. YouTube. 191 As discussed infra, Google's size and prominence changed YouTube's future and gave the company the resources to avoid the injunctive relief that ended Napster, Grokster, and many others. 192 The implication that with sufficient network effects a party can rewrite copyright may explain the seemingly awkward inclusion by Drummond that the settlement will "preserve Congress's role in setting copyright policy." 193 How does the settlement reinforce the congressional role in copyright? Drummond's testimony on behalf of Google does not actually answer this question, but rather states "[t]he settlement does not establish new copyright law; it is not even a determination on the merits of copyright law. All the settlement represents is the means by which the class of rights holders decided to resolve the lawsuit."
194 As such, Drummond both attempts to placate those at the congressional hearing, and, at the same time, to acknowledge that the center for the copyright balance has moved to Google. 195 Copyright policy has always included a balancing of competing public and industry interests regarding the copyright industries. 196 Nonetheless, the balancing has gone on within the halls of Congress rather than the campuses of Silicon Valley. 197 If copyright policy can be determined by a single, successful player, then the other copyright industries, as well as the public, may someday be at risk.
VIII. TRADEMARK BATTLES AROUND THE GLOBE
Antitrust and copyright issues are not Google's only international concerns. 198 Being the largest Internet advertiser cannot be easy. Google finds itself defending its intellectual property and business practices around the globe. 199 The practices are not uniform, yet every act of customization Courts in different cases and jurisdictions have struggled to determine whether the use of a trademark by an unauthorized party, to drive web traffic to its site, constituted trademark infringement. 201 No court, for example, has suggested that the use by a consumer of a trademark in the search for products would generate trademark infringement by that consumer. If a consumer uses "Kleenex" as a search term, the search engine will return hits for Kleenex® products, Kleenex® retailers, news stories where the word was used, and less relevant uses. Under the trademark first sale doctrine, product resellers should face no legal limits from the trademark owner for merely "displaying" the availability of the brand at its site.
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Courts have found liability, however, if the trademark is added to the domain name. A slightly different question arises if a competitor uses a trademark to generate ad links without otherwise using the competitor's trademark on its website. Specifically, one of the key sources of Google's income flows from selling text ads online, which appear in a box either on the right side of the search results or above the search results. 204 In a series of cases, including Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 205 two of Google's services have come under increasing judicial scrutiny, regarding the rights of Google to sell access to a trademark holder's mark.
AdWords is Google's program through which advertisers purchase terms (or keywords). When entered as a search term, the keyword triggers the appearance of the advertiser's ad and link. An advertiser's purchase of a particular term causes the advertiser's ad and link to be displayed on the user's screen whenever a searcher launches a Google search based on the purchased search term. Advertisers pay Google based on the number of times Internet users "click" on the advertisement, so as to link to the advertiser's website. . . .
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In addition to Adwords, Google also employs Keyword Suggestion Tool, a program that recommends keywords to advertisers to be purchased. The program is designed to improve the effectiveness of advertising by helping advertisers identify keywords related to their area of commerce, resulting in the placement of their ads before users who are likely to be responsive to it. . . . Once an advertiser buys a particular keyword, Google links the keyword to that advertiser's advertisement. The advertisements consist of a combination of content and a link to the advertiser's webpage. Google displays these advertisements on the search result page either in the right margin or in a horizontal band immediately above the column of relevance-based search results. These advertisements are generally associated with a label, which says "sponsored link" . . . 
. . Google's objective in its AdWords and Keyword Suggestion
Tool programs is to sell keywords to advertisers. 208 In early jurisprudence on the issue, the threshold analysis focused on whether the sale of the keyword was a "use in commerce" of the plaintiff's trademark. 209 The "use in commerce" language in the Lanham Act has a number of potentially different meanings. 210 Until this year, courts in the Second Circuit had interpreted the term to require that the trademark appear on the potential infringer's page; merely purchasing the keyword for promotion of a sponsored link was insufficient. 211 Other circuits had not followed this interpretation and found the sale of the keywords was sufficient to be "in commerce." 212 In a dispute between GEICO and Google, for example, the Virginia district court found the sale of the keyword sufficient to establish the trademark was "in commerce" and "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising."
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The Gilson trademark treatise agreed with this broader interpretation.
214 "The 'use in commerce' requirement means that the mark has traveled in or affected interstate commerce and 'commercial use' means that the use attempts to influence consumers to purchase goods or services." The rationale for relying on the definition of "use in commerce" provided in section fortyfive of the Lanham Act is flawed for several reasons. First, the courts are applying the definition of "use in commerce" outside of the context for which it was intended. Second, infringement under the Lanham Act does not require a visual use of the trademark. Third, trademark keying is a use of a trademark in a manner that indicates the source or origin. Fourth, the Rescuecom v. Google court's analogy to retail store product placement is flawed. Finally, the courts failed to consider that the invisible use of trademarks in metatags has long been considered a trademark use.
Id. "in commerce." 216 GoTo's product "solicit[ed] bids from advertisers for key words or phrases to be used as search terms, giving priority results on searches for those terms to the highest-paying advertiser." 217 This met the "use in commerce" test.
GoTo makes trademark use of the JR marks in three ways. First, by accepting bids from those competitors of JR desiring to pay for prominence in search results, GoTo trades on the value of the marks. Second, by ranking its paid advertisers before any 'natural' listings in a search results list, GoTo has injected itself into the marketplace, acting as a conduit to steer potential customers away from JR to JR's competitors. Finally, through the Search Term Suggestion Tool, GoTo identifies those of JR's marks which are effective search terms and markets them to JR's competitors. Presumably, the more money advertisers bid and the more frequently advertisers include JR's trademarks among their selected search terms, the more advertising income GoTo is likely to gain.
218
The Northern District of California adopted this reasoning against Google, finding that the use of the plaintiff's trademarks in the AdWords advertising program constituted a use in commerce that is likely to cause consumer confusion. 219 Other courts have likewise found that the "use in commerce" exception is no longer a barrier to trademark infringement actions. Cases in Minnesota and Virginia, for example, have tended to conflate the concepts of "use in commerce" and "commercial use" but in doing so focus on the sale of the keyword rather than its absence on the third party website. 220 As a result, in those cases, the purchase of a trademark has been held to infringe the mark.
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The Second Circuit decision in Rescuecom reinforces the trend to treat the sale of keywords as a use in commerce. 222 This opinion is noteworthy because of the thoughtful correction provided by the Court regarding the technical bar that had developed surrounding the term "in com-merce." 223 Of course, as the decisions against Google in California and Virginia point out, the mere use of the keywords does not automatically give rise to liability for infringement. Rescuecom and Google settled their dispute following the Second Circuit decision. 224 Nonetheless, the legal issues involving Google's use of keyword advertising continue.
[W]here keyword placement of . . . advertising is being sold, the portals and search engines are taking advantage of the drawing power and goodwill of these famous marks. The question is whether this activity is fair competition or whether it is a form of unfair free riding on the fame of well-known marks.
225
With the barrier of "in commerce" lifted, the courts must still determine whether the use by a third party constitutes a likelihood of initial interest confusion. 226 The focus of this confusion is generally referred to as "initial interest confusion" because the consumer undoubtedly realizes that he has been directed elsewhere prior to the completion of the transaction. 227 Nevertheless, where the goods or services directly compete and the mark is sufficiently strong, the unauthorized trademark user has effectively purchased the plaintiff's trademark for the purpose of generating customer interest from the competitor's mark. 228 Initial interest confusion is still applied through the likelihood of confusion test. 229 Although described differently in various circuits, the general parameters are the same in each. 230 In reviewing the question, several factors are accorded greater significance, including: the strength of the mark, the similarity between the two marks, the good faith of the party utilizing the second mark, and actual confusion.
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The strength of the mark often dominates the outcome of these disputes. GEICO is a famous, heavily ad-supported trademark, and Rescuecom's website receives 17,000 to 30,000 hits monthly. 232 The similarity of the two marks will also play an important factor, limiting even owners of famous marks from not to reaching too broadly to stop unrelated uses. 233 Owners of trademarks that wish to police keywords will need to improve the survey evidence of actual confusion. The evidence presented thus far suggests the Sponsored Links do generate a great deal of confusion.
234
"According to the survey results, 67.6% of test group respondents expected that they would reach GEICO's [w]eb site if they clicked on the Sponsored Links, and 69.5% thought that the Sponsored Links were either links to GEICO's site or affiliated with GEICO in some way."
235
Despite the GEICO Court's disdain for the survey, it nonetheless found these numbers sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion for the Sponsored Links, though the GEICO Court felt the same survey's flaw compelled a different result for the keywords.
236 Such evidence will only become more sophisticated in future cases.
The final factor, however, may become the most significant. Where Google sold trademarks to direct competitors of the trademark holder and those competitors purchased the trademarks of their direct competition for the purpose of promoting Sponsored Links when the public sought information about particular trademarks, courts are increasingly likely to find a likelihood of confusion. 237 The reason is simple: the sale of trademarks for that purpose intentionally deceives the public using the search engine. Other commentators have even stronger opinions: Nonetheless, courts should broaden the interpretation to encompass the activities of Google in trademark keying in AdWords. Google is more directly involved in the infringement than those acting as service providers have historically been because Google is not merely a passive conduit for the infringing activity, but Google actually sells the trademarks to the advertisers. Google also designs the appearance and sets the location of the advertisements in a manner most likely to deceive consumers into believing they have selected an organic search result. Google just recently changed the background of the "sponsored links" that top the search results from a pastel blue to a barely noticeable pale yellow. The pale yellow background is virtually impossible to see, so even search engine users who are aware that paid advertisements appear before the search results will likely be confused.
239
The alternative view is that the public does not recognize or respect brand names, such that the use of those brands in keyword searches is merely shorthand for the product category.
240 But this approach undermines the entirety of trademark practice. A policy designed to encourage the public's disparagement of trademarks will reduce their value.
241 A system in which searches using trademarks will not automatically convert trademarks into product categories will improve the trademark's function as a designation of source or origin for a product.
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Keywords are not the only way in which trademarks may be improperly used on the Internet. Google is often discussed in the context of meta tags because some search engines rely on matching words and their frequency for search relevancy. 243 party's trademark in one's meta tags or in hidden text 245 can give rise to trademark liability. 246 The liability for use of meta tags or hidden text will arise from initial interest confusion where the introduction of the plaintiff's trademark is designed to attract business for the defendant. 247 However, if the use of the meta tag accurately reflects the information on the site, then no liability should arise. 248 Along with hidden text and hidden links, meta tags can be used to fool these types of search tools and create better search returns. 249 Google will remove a site from its listings if it uses misleading meta tags or hidden text and links. 250 Additionally, Google does not utilize meta tags or hidden text in its Page Rank algorithms. 251 As a result, it is not directly involved in most meta tag lawsuits.
X. ANOTHER DUST-UP OVER CONTENT DISTRIBUTION
YouTube, a social media network for sharing video clips, has been one of the more interesting acquisitions made by Google. 252 Purchased in 2006, the site was regarded as a video equivalent of Napster: an innovative technology, a cultural phenomenon, and a hotbed of copyright infringement. 253 By March 2007, the film and television conglomerates had had enough. Viacom International, Paramount Pictures and other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking to stop the unauthorized posting of broadcast content on YouTube.
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The copyright owners claimed to have "identified more than 150,000 unauthorized clips of their copyrighted programming on YouTube that had been viewed an astounding 1.5 billion times." 255 There has never been any factual dispute that at least tens of thousands of files have been uploaded to YouTube without the copyright owners' consent. The real question is whether YouTube's efforts have been sufficient under the take-down provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to provide it safe harbor protection from liability. 256 But given the increasingly close relations Google has developed with the broadcast industry and its continuing attempt to serve as advertising distributor for television, the decision in the dispute will be largely irrelevant to the long term evolution of video media distribution. 257 In the months following the initial filing of Viacom v. YouTube, a number of agreements have been made involving licensed music videos and other content on YouTube, changing the relationship among the litigants to that of business partners. 258 For example, a website named Vevo.com has been under development through a joint effort of YouTube and Universal Music Group. 259 Rather than serving to redefine market dominance in the entertainment field for upcoming generations, this titanic litigation is likely to merely shift money from one company to another, based on historic business practices. The result will alter the influence each litigant has at the bargaining table, but it will do little to shift the transition in media relations among content producers, distributors, and consumers.
Nonetheless, the legal interpretation of the DMCA will have a significant impact on other intellectual property companies that rely on the safe harbor provisions, and their efforts to comply. Section 512 of the Copyright Act creates a safe harbor for an Internet service provider which serves to transmit Internet traffic, temporarily cache content on its system, or host content at the "direction of users." 260 The term "service provider means, [inter alia], a provider of online services or network access. . . ." 261 Although this definition is not particularly illuminating, it is likely to include YouTube. YouTube serves as a host to the videos uploaded by the public. 262 It provides tools to upload but does not edit or select content.
263
As a result of its service provider function, YouTube will likely be immune from monetary damages or injunctive relief if it does not have knowledge of the infringing material posted by its users, does not gain a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity, and takes expeditious steps to remove the infringing material once it receives proper notice of the infringement. 264 Given the scale of unauthorized traffic on YouTube's site, it is hard to imagine that a jury would believe YouTube had no knowledge of infringing activity. Indeed, like the facts in Napster, it may become clear that the bulk of YouTube traffic was focused on copyrighted material, particularly popular television clips. 265 YouTube acknowledges the significant copyright infringement on the site but counters that it has been diligent in responding to notices to remove the infringing material, even when those notices did not necessarily meet the statutory requirements. 266 YouTube has long said it removes such proprietary clips when owners demand it, but [in October 2007] the company took a more conciliatory stance. It announced a program under which copyright holders can provide YouTube with advance copies of their programming for identification purposes. Using new software, YouTube said, it can then automatically remove clips as users post them. 267 The scale of the problem faced by YouTube is enormous. 268 Were YouTube not in existence, there would be an even larger multitude of video-hosting sites, increasing the burden on a copyright holder to police the Internet.
The crux of the litigation will center on the extent to which the content owners can prove YouTube staff were "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."
269 Any quick search on YouTube will generate content that the copyright holders did not post. 270 Type in a song title and many different performances of the song will appear. In such cases, not only does the copyright holder in the video have a copyright infringement claim (against the unauthorized uploader, if no one else), but in many cases, so do the composer and lyricist of the song. 271 Google and YouTube continue to improve the technology to filter infringing content. 272 Among the tens of thousands of files, there have undoubtedly been some notices that were misfiled and some removals that were not expeditious. On the other hand, YouTube transformed itself from a small viral company, building a business out of commercial copyrights, to a dominant Internet Web host that actively polices content. 273 YouTube will likely recognize that some of its value stemmed from the infringing activities of the company before it began working more closely with television and film companies.
XI. SITTING WITH COPYRIGHT ON ITS HEAD
What does the ubiquity of the unauthorized content on YouTube tell us about copyright policy? Comparing the possible results in Viacom v. YouTube with the provisions of the Google Book Search leads to an interesting insight about copyright-the rights are not that important. In a minority of cases, copyright owners actively police their highly valuable rights, and in a few cases, thin-skinned artists may choose to over-police those rights. 274 In what seems to be the overwhelming majority of cases, however, the copyright owners are comfortable allowing the unauthorized materials to remain available, even when the only transaction cost is a simple take-down notice. 275 The implications from the conduct of copyright owners engaged with YouTube, the Google Book search, and other fora suggest that there may be multiple norms for copyright. The incentive for the publisher of a highly valuable work is to maximize the exploitation of that work. This may be to control the distribution or simply to garner the revenue. For example, clips from "The Colbert Report" were pulled off YouTube, but Comedy Central made them all available in an authorized manner on its own site. 276 For academic authors, out-of-print authors, and many other artists, there may be a desire to give less than everything away while still choosing not to enforce the legal rights available.
The end result is a copyright policy upside down from the 1976 Copyright Act. 277 Copyright owners are expected to take the first step to object to a posting on the Internet. If the objection is ignored, then the copyright owner receives the support of the law. But the copyright owner can choose not to act. 278 Since then the situation has worsened. In December 2009, Google and twenty or more U.S. companies were targeted with sophisticated cyber attacks. 285 Google and the U.S. State Department publicly suggested that the Chinese government is to blame for the attacks, either directly or through its tacit approval, 286 noting that "a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists." 287 Other reports suggest a broader array of targets including, "Northrop Grumman, the US [defense] contractor; Dow, the chemicals giant; Adobe Systems, the software firm; and an American law firm acting for Cybersitter, a firm pursuing a $2.2 billion lawsuit against China."
288 While these targets may include dissidents, it is undoubtedly not the only goal of China's cyber attack policy. In fact, "Joel Brenner, former director of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, has identified China as the origin point of extensive malicious cyber activities that target the United States." 289 Comparing the attacks suffered in December with the ongoing reports of China's cyber-intrusions, it is unlikely that the goal was merely to harass Chinese dissidents (though the likelihood that this was part of the activity is certainly true enough).
The characterization of the motive for the attacks does not lessen the precarious relationship between Beijing and Google-or Beijing and Washington-nor does it take away the evidence of the very real threat posed by the totalitarian regime. It does, however, suggest that Google may want to depict its response as moral outrage rather than calculated economics. Google's economic exposure to China is presently calculated at roughly five percent of its income, with revenues ranging from $300 to $600 million. 290 Google runs a distant second in the online search business to Baidu, which has seventy-five percent of the market compared to Google's twenty percent.
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Once it adds the sales of its Android cellular phones, its potential revenue and its potential exposure increase dramatically. 292 As a result, one of Google's initial responses has been to delay the introduction of the Android phone operating system in China. 293 Another of its responses has been to eliminate censorship of Google.cn, which is a condition of its operations in China. 294 Do these responses stem from Google's moral outrage at the blatant attacks on Chinese dissidents, or are they the business calculations of a company threatened by trade secret theft and the potential risk of outright sabotage?
295 Increasingly, the analysis of the attack is focusing less on the dissidents and more on the damage that may have been caused by the attacks and the potential for the attackers to have inserted their software code into the operating software of the targets. 296 Such code could create longterm security breaches or be used for later sabotage; 297 accordingly the situation has worsened for Google and all U.S. content companies. Of course, censorship is not a big secret in China. China employs approximately 30,000 people as censors. They have names and faces, and they may negotiate with a publisher about a particularly sensitive topic. They are less likely to negotiate with bloggers, because there are so many bloggers, but the government reportedly does train bloggers in how to post in support of government policy, and if you are lucky you can get a job (reportedly at $0.50 per post) doing the government's bidding. So why has Google made a fuss and threatened to walk out of China? The answer probably stems from a combination of-or rather, a changing calculus aroundbusiness interests and values. The censorship issue has long grated at Google (Brin, with his Russian background, is reported to be especially hostile to censorship), but the company could argue that transparency about censorship was better than not serving China at all. The censorship, however, has been getting worse. Perhaps the initial argument Google is engaged in a highly visible negotiation with the Chinese government. 299 If it shuts down its search engine, Google will claim an expensive but moral victory, while China will in fact achieve greater content control over the Internet and greater market share for its national service. 300 Ironically, shutting the Google search site then becomes a win-win solution that may allow Google to continue some other operations in China free from the moral dilemmas it now faces and confrontational position it now holds. 301 It may also be a strategic retreat given the challenges Google has faced with Baidu over music search, cyber cafes, and staffing issues as well as ongoing government interference. 302 The strategy followed by Google is one previously adopted by Yahoo! 303 but not a viable one for Microsoft or Apple to follow. Yahoo! left China, selling back its majority stake in Alibaba (though it retains a thirtynine percent ownership interest). 304 Microsoft and Apple, Google's real competitors, both have significant software and hardware sales that make their entanglement with China impossible to unwind. 305 They face many of the same hurdles as Google but stand to lose a much greater investment were they to follow the moral high road being forged by Google. 306 A temporary retreat on search services may open the door to renew cellular phone competition.
Finally, the market may not be as clear cut as these assumptions suggest. Significant Chinese advertising funds are spent on the U.S. Google site, revenue which is unlikely to be lost as a result of the change. 307 Moreover, an increasingly large number of people living in countries with Internet filtering are migrating to sophisticated software, virtual private networks, proxy servers or similar tools that connect through other countries' servers and thereby avoid the territorial limitations and the resulting censorship. 308 For those users, Google will likely continue to be a preferred destination. Therefore, Google may risk less and have less to lose than its blog suggests. 309 In contrast, Microsoft and Apple have fewer such silver linings to rationalize the coming thunder storm. If business is a race, then slowing one's opponent is almost as good as moving faster. Google remains the most nimble giant bestriding the Internet.
XIII. PREDICTIONS & CONCLUSION
Beyond the legal challenges, Google remains in a very competitive fight with Microsoft for its ad revenue. 310 The introduction of Bing may do more to impact the Internet giants than any of the pending litigation. But Google will not stand still. By next year, its search algorithm will have been updated, and its new operating system launched. 311 In the upcoming environment, it is likely the corporate boards will be unlocked as the grappling intensifies. Google deserves to face antitrust scrutiny for its interlocking board memberships and the horizontal price fixing inherent in the Google Book Search. The discussions over orphan works will continue, hopefully with a more robust legislative solution, but orphan works will not derail the settlement. 312 The benefits to Google of having immunity from suit by a group of parties that cannot be identified will not be the antitrust barrier to the Google Book Search. Despite legitimate antitrust concerns, the trajectory of the company remains that of a fierce competitor in a challenging market. Google's copyright liability for YouTube and the Google Book Search will continue to be matters of great speculation, but neither will have significant impacts on the company or copyright law. International issues will trouble Google, but these concerns are endemic to all U.S. software companies. 313 They may preclude success in particular territories, but they will not threaten to undermine the company more broadly.
Only in the area of trademark law is Google vulnerable. The sale of advertising and promotion of keywords lies at the heart of Google's revenue stream. The sale of trademarks in its AdWords program will continually grow as a source of liability for the company in the U.S. and around the world. Google and other search companies will be compelled to stop trading in the trademarks of others. To the extent that the use of trademarks improve advertising sales rather than merely change where the advertising dollars are spent, the change could cost Google significant revenue.
Google has charted its course as an advertising company and it remains one. It will continue to explore new ways to deliver content that it can use to market its advertising, but it will not transform itself into a software company. The real question is whether, in an age of "free," more and more competitors are becoming advertising companies as well. Does Google deserve special treatment for its commitment not to be evil? If the standard is a comparison to its direct competitors, then it has failed. Google, along with Apple and Microsoft, provides valuable products and services, but in a tenacious, competitive manner. Google is no more-and no less-evil than the others.
